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COMMENTAIRE
CROWNING GLORY : LIABILITY IN NEGLIGENCE
OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES REVISITED
by Peter BOWAL*
Lynn BOLAND**
Cet article retrace les développements du droit qui ont permis qu'un
recours pour négligence puisse être intenté contre la Couronne. La décision de
la Chambre des Lords dans l'affaire Anns a laissé aux canadiens un héritage
durable. Elle oblige à distinguer selon que la sphère de gouvernement en
question est politique (non sujette à révision) ou fonctionnelle (révisable). Mais
ce modèle est néanmoins peu pratique et ne comprend aucun critère
d'application uniforme. La Cour Suprême du Canada eut récemment l'occasion,
dans l'affaire Brown puis l'affaire Swinamer, d'établir une approche plus
efficace au problème de la responsabilité des autorités publiques pour
négligence, mais s'est abstenue de le faire. Les auteurs suggèrent que ces deux
affaires ne font que confirmer la politique judiciaire canadienne actuelle de
respecter la voie tracée par l'affaire Anns, et ce malgré ses faiblesses inhérentes
et les incertitudes qui en découlent.
                       
This article traces the development of the law which gradually permitted
negligence actions to be brought against the Crown.  The House of Lords
decision in Anns has had a durable legacy in Canada.  It calls for
characterizing the sphere of government activity in question as either political
(not reviewable) or operational (reviewable).  The model is, nevertheless,
unwieldy and lacks standards for predictable application.  The Supreme Court
of Canada had occasion recently in the cases of Brown and Swinamer to craft
a more effective approach to the issue of negligence liability for public
authorities, but failed to do so.  The authors submit that these two cases merely
affirm Canadian judicial policy to stay the Anns course for now,
notwithstanding the attendant weaknesses and uncertainties of it.
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of public authorities revisited
1. (1788), 1 T.R. 673, per Justice Ashhurst.
2. [1978] A.C. 728, [1977] 2 All E.R. 492 [hereinafter Anns].
3. [1980] 2. S.C.R. 418, (1980), 114 D.L.R. (3d) 577, 14 C.C.L.T. 169, 13 M.P.L.R. 116, 8
M.V.R. 294, 27 B.C.L.R. 182, 33 N.R. 293, 5 A.C.W.S. (2d) 259 [hereinafter Barratt].
4. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2, (1984), 10 D.L.R. (4th) 641, 29 C.C.L.T. 97, 26 M.P.L.R. 81, [1984] 5
W.W.R. 1, 66 B.C.L.R. 273, 54 N.R. 1, 26 A.C.W.S. (2d) 453 [hereinafter Kamloops].
5. [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228, 103 N.R. 1, 64 D.L.R. (4th) 689, 41 Admin. L.R. 161, 1 C.C.L.T.
(2d) 1, [1989] I.L.R. ¶93,042, 18 M.V.R. (2d) 1, [1990] 1 W.W.R. 385, 41 B.C.L.R. (2d)
350, 18 A.C.W.S. (3d) 527 [hereinafter Just] (cited to S.C.R.).
6. [1994] 1 S.C.R. 420, (1994), 112 D.L.R. (4th) 1, [1994] 4 W.W.R. 194, 89 B.C.L.R. 1, 46
A.C.W.S. (3d) 797 [hereinafter Brown]  (cited to D.L.R.).
7. [1994] 1 S.C.R. 445, (1994), 163 N.R. 291, 112 D.L.R. (4th) 18, 46 A.C.W.S. (3d) 798
[hereinafter Swinamer] (cited to D.L.R.).
Better that an individual should suffer an injury
than that the public should suffer an
inconvenience.
 Russell v. The Mayor of Devon1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Canada recently issued contemporaneous
judgments in two cases involving claims of negligence on the part of public
authorities.  The court again applied the «policy» versus «operations» decision-
making model to determine liability.  These principles, originally laid out in
Anns v. Merton London Borough Council2, were relied upon in decisions such
as Barratt v. North Vancouver3, City of Kamloops v. Nielsen4 and were more
recently expounded upon in Just v. British Columbia5.  These two new cases,
Brown v. British Columbia (Minister of Transportation)6 and Swinamer v. Nova
Scotia (Attorney General)7, are important in how they demonstrate the court's
steadfast adherence to this approach to negligence of public authorities.
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8. For an overview of the evolution of liability of public authorities, see :  L.A. REYNOLDS
and D.A. HICKS, «New Directions for the Civil Liability of Public Authorities in Canada»,
(1992) 71 Can. Bar Rev. 1, and Paul M. PERELL, «Negligence Claims Against Public
Authorities», (1994) 16 Advocates' Q. 48.
9. Now the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, R.S.C 1985, c. C-50, as amended by S.C.
1990, c. 8.
10. East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v. Kent [1941] A.C. 74, [1940] 4 All E.R. 527 (H.L.).
The plaintiffs' land was damaged as a result of flooding created by high spring tides and
strong winds.  The municipality undertook to repair the river bank by the authority granted
in the Land Drainage Act, 1930 which included [at 529] «...the power to repair any existing
watercourse or drainage work».  In setting out the facts of the case, the House of Lords
agreed with the lower courts [at 530] : «...that the methods adopted and the staff employed
in trying to repair the damage to the wall with which we are concerned in this case were so
inefficient that, whereas the gap could, by the exercise of reasonable skill, have been closed
and the flooding arresting in 14 days, this result was not in fact attained till after the lapse
of 164 days.»
Despite the official incompetence, however, the Board's conduct was held to be within the
limits of statutory discretion.  The House of Lords found that a municipality was immune
when it had a discretionary authority to act provided by statute - even when there was a
failure to act.  Liability could only be founded where the municipal body acted out of a
statutory duty.  Accordingly, the plaintiffs' claim for damages was dismissed.  Viscount
Simon L.C. in the majority decision refers to the dissent of du Parcq L.J. from the Court of
Appeal [at 532 and 544] : «du Parcq, L.J., in his dissenting judgment, points out that, when
Parliament has left it to a public authority to decide which of its powers it shall exercise, and
when and to what extent it shall exercise them, this may raise [p. 184] : ...a question
involving the consideration of matters of policy and sometimes the striking of a just balance
between the rival claims of efficiency and thrift.»
II. BACKGROUND TO THE DOCTRINE
The question of the liability of public authorities for their decisions and
actions has its roots in the principles of Crown immunity.  While it had long
been held that the Crown was immune from tortious claims, there has been a
gradual erosion of this immunity such that the Crown is increasingly liable for
its actions8.
The Canadian Crown Liability Act9 was passed in 1951 following the
enactment of the United Kingdom statute four years earlier which had provided
for general tortious liability of the Crown.  Until that time, the Crown suffered
no legal liability10.  However, public dissatisfaction with an inability to find
anyone liable to plaintiffs who had endured injury at the hands of the Crown
incited reform.  In Canada between 1951 and 1974 nine of the provincial
Crowning glory :
(1994) 24 R.D.U.S. liability in negligence 439
of public authorities revisited
11. Quebec resisted the reform occurring throughout Canada because of its view that liability
existed at common law by virtue of The King v. Cliche [1935] S.C.R. 561.  Moreover,
Article 1011 of the Code of Civil Procedure provided that «any person having a claim to
exercise against the Government of this Province...[could] address a petition of right to Her
Majesty».
12. See :  Alberta :  Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. P-18; British
Columbia : Crown Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 86; Manitoba : Proceedings Against
the Crown Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. P-140; New Brunswick : Proceedings Against the Crown
Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. P-18; Newfoundland : Proceedings Against the Crown Act, S.N.
1973, c. 59; Nova Scotia : Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 360;
Ontario : Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 393; Prince Edward Island
: Crown Proceedings Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. C-32; Saskatchewan : Proceedings Against
the Crown Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. P-27.
13. The Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on The Liability of the Crown (1989) at
p. 12.
14. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).  The terminology used was «planning» versus «policy», but the meaning
is the same.  See, the Ontario Law Reform Commission, ibid : However, the liability of the
Crown in negligence is limited by a distinction drawn by the courts between the planning
level of government and the operational level of government.
15. Ibid., at 42.
jurisdictions11 passed legislation based on the British model.  The changes
typically stated that the Crown would be liable in tort as if it were «...a private
person of full age and capacity»12.  Even today, actionable negligence of the
Crown continues to represent an important public policy.  The Ontario Law
Reform Commission has said that13 :
«... the most important head of tortious liability of the Crown, and
ordinary negligence principles apply to the Crown as to any other
person.»
The origins of the policy and operations distinction for Crown liability
is found in forty year old American jurisprudence which sought to only partially,
and rationally, open the door to suits of negligence against the state.  The United
States Supreme Court in Dalehite v. United States14 found that the «planning»
decision to export dangerous fertilizer did not give rise to liability for the
subsequent port explosion.  The court stated it this way15 :
«In short, the alleged "negligence" does not subject the Government
to liability.  The decisions held culpable were all responsibly made at
a planning rather than operational level and involved considerations
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16. (1955) 350 U.S. 61, 76 S. Ct. 122 (cited to U.S.).
17. Ibid., at 69.
18. [1971] S.C.R. 957, [1972] 3 W.W.R. 433, 22 D.L.R. (3d) 470.
more or less important to the practicability of the Government's
fertilizer program.»
Similarly, Indian Towing Co. v. United States16 adopted the distinction.
In that case the owners of a tug and barge, which had run aground due to a burnt
out warning light in the lighthouse, alleged negligence on the part of the Coast
Guard.  The Supreme Court held that17 :
«The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse service.  But
once it exercised its discretion to operate a light on Chandeleur Island
and engendered reliance on the guidance afforded by the light, it was
obligated to use due care to make certain that the light was kept in
good working order; and, if the light did become extinguished, then
the Coast guard was further obligated to use due care to discover this
fact and to repair the light or give warning that it was not functioning.
If the Coast Guard failed in its duty and damage was thereby caused
to petitioners, the United States is liable...»
The Coast Guard had failed in the operational aspect of its duties to
inspect the lighthouse and was liable to the owner of the ship who had suffered
financial loss.
The arrival of this approach on Canadian shores began with Welbridge
Holdings Ltd. v. Metropolitan Corp. of Greater Winnipeg18, in which the
Supreme Court of Canada ruled that even where a municipality acts incorrectly,
the exercise of that discretion at the policy level renders it immune and not
subject to any private law duty of care.  In that case, a municipal corporation
revoked a building permit because it had itself failed to advise opponents to the
development project of the re-zoning of the affected property. The developer
brought suit against the municipality for damages for negligence.  Laskin J., as
he then was, held that where a municipality errs while exercising its «legislative
capacity» or its «quasi-judicial duty», it is immune from civil liability, even
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19. «Legislative» or «quasi-judicial» came to mean «policy» decisions : P. HOGG, Liability of
the Crown, 2nd ed., Toronto, Carswell, 1989, at 124.
20. Ibid., at 968-70 (S.C.R.), 751-752 (A.C.), 498 (All E.R.).
21. Ibid., at 505-06 (All E.R.).
though it acts improperly. No duty of care is owed in such circumstances19.
This principle was entrenched with the House of Lords decision in Anns.
There the plaintiffs were lessees of a building which showed signs of structural
damage when the walls started to crack and the floors began to slope.  They
asserted that the building had been built on foundations that were not in
accordance with the plans which had been deposited with the Council as
required by the by-laws. These foundations were only to a depth of two feet six
inches, instead of three feet or deeper as shown on the plans.  The plaintiffs
alleged that the municipality was liable for the damage because the building
inspector had either carried out the inspection negligently or was negligent if no
inspection had taken place.
Lord Wilberforce, for the majority, mused that there ought to be a
distinction between «operational» areas and «policy» areas and that it was only
the latter which should provide immunity for public authorities from claims of
negligence.  In order to establish if a duty of care was owed, two questions were
presented20 :
«First one has to ask whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and
the person who has suffered damage, there is a sufficient relationship
of proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable
contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part may be likely to
cause damage to the latter - in which case a prima facie duty of care
arises.  Secondly, if the first question is answered affirmatively, it is
necessary to consider whether there are any considerations which
ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or class
of person to whom it is owed or the damages to which a breach of it
may give rise...»
Lord Wilberforce concluded21 :
«... (3) that the council would not be guilty of a breach of duty in not
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22. Supra, note 3.
23. Supra, note 4.  Wilson J. applied the principle in Anns to the facts in Kamloops at 664 : ...it
is fair to say that the City of Kamloops had a statutory power to regulate construction by-
law.  It did not have to do so.  It was in its discretion whether to do so or not.  It was, in
other words, a «policy» decision.  However, not only did it make the policy decision in
favour of regulating construction by-law, it also imposed on the city's building inspector a
duty to enforce the provisions of the by-law.  This would be Lord Wilberforce's
«operational» duty.
The Court concluded that the operational level of the decision regarding enforcement
established a duty of care to the homeowners.  Further, the municipality was liable for
negligence because its failure to enforce the by-law did not stem from a policy decision
given that no policy decision had been made.
24. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 705, (1989), 94 N.R. 1, 45 M.P.L.R. 1, [1990] I.L.R. ¶93,049, 23 Q.A.C.
1, 15 A.C.W.S. (3d) 95.
25. Supra, note 5.
carrying out inspection of the foundations of the block unless it were
shown (a) not properly to have exercised its discretion as to the
making of inspections, and (b) to have failed to exercise reasonable
care in its acts or omissions to secure that the byelaws' application to
the foundations of the block were complied with; (4) that the council
would be liable to the plaintiffs for breach of duty if it were proved
that its inspector having assumed the duty of inspecting the
foundations, and acting otherwise than in the bona fide exercise of any
discretion under the Act, did not exercise reasonable care to ensure
that the byelaws applicable to the foundations were complied with...»
The court dismissed the appeal. The council had owed a private duty of
care.
III. RECENT CANADIAN APPLICATIONS OF ANNS
Throughout the 1980's, cases such as Barratt22, Kamloops23 and
Laurentide Motels v. City of Beauport24 were faithful to Anns when determining
the liability of public authorities.  By 1989, the decision rendered in Just25
attempted a development in this area of the law, but one might ask how, if at all,
the law was clarified by it.
In Just, the plaintiff and his daughter were driving on the highway to
Whistler Mountain in British Columbia for a day of skiing in January, 1982.  A
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26. Dickson C.J.C. and Wilson, La Forest, L'Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, JJ. concurred.  Sopinka
J. dissented.
27. Supra, note 5, at 1236.
28. (1985), 60 A.L.R. 1., (1985) 157 C.L.R. 424.
29. Supra, note 5 at 1242.
large boulder tumbled from the wooded slope above the highway onto their
vehicle.  The plaintiff was severely injured and his daughter was killed.  The
plaintiff alleged negligence on the part of the government for failing to properly
maintain the highway.  The trial judge found that the system of inspection and
the manner in which it was carried out was in the «policy» sphere and thus not
a matter for judicial review.  The British Columbia Court of Appeal dismissed
the appeal.
In considering the matter, Cory J. turned to the two step test outlined in
Anns by Lord Wilberforce.  Speaking for the majority26 he stated27 :
«Even with the duty of care established, it is necessary to explore two
aspects in order to determine whether liability may be imposed upon
the respondent.  First, the applicable legislation must be reviewed to
see if it imposes any obligation upon the respondent to maintain its
highways or, alternatively, if it provides an exemption from liability
for failure to so maintain them.  Secondly, it must be determined
whether the province is exempted from liability on the grounds that the
system of inspections, including their quantity and quality, constituted
a "policy" decision of a government agency and was thus exempt from
liability.»
While acknowledging that the line between «policy» and «operational»
decisions was difficult to determine, the court said that it was essential that it
was done.  Justice Mason of the Australian High Court provided guidelines in
Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman28 which Cory J. found «to be most
helpful»29 :
«...the dividing line between them [policy and operational factors] will
be observed if we recognize that a public authority is under no duty
of care in relation to decisions which involve or are dictated by
financial, economic, social or political factors or constraints.  Thus
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30. Ibid., at 1246.
31. At 1246 : At trial the conclusion was reached that the number and frequency of inspections,
of scaling and other remedial measures were matters of policy; as a result no findings of fact
were made on the issues bearing on the standard of care.  Since the matter was one of
operation the respondent was not immune from suit and the negligence issue had to be
canvassed in its entirety.  The appellant was therefore entitled to a finding of fact on these
questions and a new trial should be directed to accomplish this.
32. Ibid., at 1247-48.
budgetary allocations and the constraints which they entail in terms
of allocation of resources cannot be made the subject of a duty of
care.» (original emphasis)
Notwithstanding a greater invitation to see government action as subject
to the call on public resources and political vagaries, Cory J. refused to see this
action in Just as policy30 :
«... the public authorities had settled on a plan which called upon it to
inspect all slopes visually and then conduct further inspections of
those slopes where the taking of additional safety measures was
warranted.  Those matters are all part and parcel of what Mason J.
described as "the product of administrative direction, expert or
professional opinion, technical standards or general standards of
care."  They were not decisions that could be designated as policy
decisions.»
As such, the system of highway inspection was found to be in the
operational sphere and, accordingly, it was held that a private law duty of care
resulted.  Not only was the system of inspection required to be reasonable but
there was an onus for reasonableness in the manner in which the inspections
were carried out.  The case was remitted for trial on the negligence issues31.
By contrast, Sopinka J. agreed with the lower courts.  He said32 :
«... In my opinion, the conclusion of the trial judge (1985), 64 B.C.L.R.
349, and a unanimous Court of Appeal (1986), 10 B.C.L.R. (2d) 223,
was the correct one.  This conclusion is expressed by Hinkson J.A.,
speaking for the court affirming the following passage from the
reasons of McLachlin J. (now of this Court) :
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33. Sopinka J. at 1251-52 also found support in earlier decisions : The extent of the liability of
a municipality in British Columbia was settled by Barratt v. District of North Vancouver,
[1980] 2 S.C.R. 418.  While a municipality has the authority to maintain highways, it has
no duty to do so.  What it does in this respect is within its statutory discretion.
...
My colleague's reasons are based essentially on an attack on the policy of the respondent
with respect to the extent and manner of the inspection program.  In my opinion, absent
evidence that a policy was adopted for some ulterior motive and not for a municipal purpose,
it is not open to a litigant to attack it, nor is it appropriate for a court to pass upon it.  As
stated by Lord du Parcq in  Kent v. East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board [1940] 1 K.B. 319,
at p. 338 :
...it must be remembered that when Parliament has left it to a public authority to decide
which of its powers it shall exercise, and when and to what extent it shall exercise them,
there would be some inconvenience in submitting to the subsequent decision of a jury, or
judge of fact, the question whether the authority had acted reasonably, a question involving
the consideration of matters of policy and sometimes the striking of a just balance between
the rival claims of efficiency and thrift.
This statement was approved by Lord Wilberforce in Anns...
34. Supra, note 6, at 6.
...I conclude that the decisions here complained of
fall within the area of policy and cannot be reviewed
by this court.  The number and quality of inspections
as well as the frequency of scaling and other
remedial measures were matters of planning and
policy involving the utility of scarce resources and
the balancing of needs and priorities throughout the
province.  Decisions of that nature are for the
government authorities, not the courts33.»
The judicial split in Just and the roles of shifting political will and
budgetary imperatives demonstrate the overall uncertainty, if not precariousness,
of this approach.
IV. BROWN v. BRITISH COLUMBIA
In Brown, the plaintiff was injured early in November, 1985 on a Friday
morning when he lost control of the vehicle he was driving on a patch of black
ice on the highway and went over an embankment.  The Department of
Highways was still on its summer schedule which34 :
Crowning glory :
446 liability in negligence (1994) 24 R.D.U.S.
	

35. Ibid., at p. 7. The Trial Division had two allegations of negligence on the part of the Crown
placed before it : ...failing to respond in a timely fashion to the reports of icy conditions and
to remedy them, ...(and) failing to maintain the section of the road where the accident
occurred so that ice would not form on it.
36. (1989), 17 M.V.R. (2d) 69.
37. (1992), 65 B.C.L.R. (2d) 232, [1992] 3 W.W.R. 629, 10 C.C.L.T. (2d) 188, 37 M.V.R. (2d)
70, 10 B.C.A.C. 303, 21 W.A.C. 303.
38. R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 167.
39. R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 303.
40. R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 86.
41. Gonthier, Iacobucci and Major JJ., concurring.  Actually, all seven judges agreed on the
result.  La Forest and McLachlin JJ. agreed with Cory J.'s reasons, «Subject to the comments
expressed in Swinamer».  Sopinka J. came to the same conclusion as Cory J. but for different
reasons.
«...was operated by four men working for one long shift from 7 :00
a.m. to 4 :20 p.m. from Monday through Thursday.  There was as well
a call-out system for emergencies which might occur during the
remainder of the week.»
Brown alleged that the accident and resultant injuries were the result of
negligence on the part of the Department of Highways in how it scheduled the
sanding crew as well as the manner in which the sanding was carried out under
that schedule35.  The trial judge found that the system of dispatch was a policy
matter as was the maintenance of the road «which excluded any duty of care
with respect to the injury received by Mr. Brown»36.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal found that it had not been
established at trial that there had been any failure on the part of the employees
or if there was one that it was a contributing cause of the accident.  The court
held that the decisions about staffing were not proved to be irrational nor was
it shown that the Crown and its employees failed to meet the standard of care
imposed upon it37.
To determine if a duty of care existed, the court examined the applicable
legislation and found that there was no statutory exemption from liability
contained within the Highway Act38, nor section 8 of the Occupiers Liability
Act39, nor section 3(2)(f) of the Crown Proceeding Act40.  Finding that there was
no exemption, Cory J., for the majority41, then turned to the policy versus
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42. Supra, note 6, at 15. The court noticed that there had been no allegation «... that the decision
was not made in good faith or that it was patently unreasonable.  There was therefore no
need to consider these questions.»
43. Ibid., at pp. 15-16.
44. Ibid., at 16.
operations issue in the system of schedules for the sanding crew42, and adopted
the following dictum from Just43 :
«True policy decisions involve social, political and economic factors.
In such decisions, the authority attempts to strike a balance between
efficiency and thrift, in the context of planning and predetermining the
boundaries of its undertakings and of their actual performance.  True
policy decisions will usually be dictated by financial, economic, social
and political factors or constraints.
The operational area is concerned with the practical implementation
of the formulated policies, it mainly covers the performance or
carrying out of a policy.  Operational decisions will usually be made
on the basis of administrative direction, expert or professional
opinion, technical standards or general standards of reasonableness.»
Cory, J. viewed the decision of the department to maintain a summer
schedule for the duration that it did, as one of policy44 :
«... involving classic policy considerations of financial resources,
personnel and significant negotiations with government unions. It was
truly a governmental decision involving social, political and economic
factors.»
Such a decision is not reviewable by the courts.  Neither was there an
allegation that the decision was not bona fide or outside of the area of a proper
exercise of discretion; the court, therefore, was not required to turn its attention
to those matters.  Additionally, the allegations of negligence in the manner of the
call-out system did not prove to be material to the matter at hand.  Accordingly,
the appeal was dismissed.
Justice Sopinka, in a judgment that agreed with the disposition favoured
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45. See D. COHEN and J.C. SMITH, «Entitlement and the Body Politic :  Rethinking
Negligence in Public Law» (1986) 64 Can. Bar Rev. 1;  M.K. WOODALL, «Private Law
Liability of Public Authorities for Negligent Inspection and Regulation» (1992) 37  McGill
L.J. 83; J.A. SMILLIE, «Liability of Public Authorities for Negligence» (1985) 23 U.W.O.L.
Rev. 213; S.H. BAILEY and M.J. BOWMAN, «The Policy/Operational Dichotomy -- A
Cuckoo in the Nest», [1986] Cambridge L.J. 430; L.N. KLAR, «The Supreme Court of
Canada :  Extending the Tort Liability of Public Authorities» (1990) 28 Alta. L.Rev. 648;
P.M. PERELL, «Negligence Claims against Public Authorities» (1994) 16 Advocates' Q. 48.
46. Supra, note 7, at 22.
by the other judges, did not concur in the approach taken.  As he observed in
Barratt, in Brown there is no statutory duty to maintain the highways, only the
power to do so.  Justice Sopinka also took issue with the reliance on the policy
versus operational spheres in the determination of a duty of care.  In support of
this position he referred to the growing body of academic literature45 which is
critical of the «policy/operational» line of reasoning as the basis of determining
liability for public authorities.
V. SWINAMER v. NOVA SCOTIA
In Swinamer, the plaintiff was also involved in an accident while driving
his vehicle.  In this instance however, a tree from private property adjacent to
the roadway fell on his truck.  He was severely injured.  He alleged that the
Transportation Department was negligent in its duty to take reasonable steps to
maintain the highway in such a manner so as to prevent accidents.  The
Department's responsibilities were described as follows46 :
«As part of the ordinary maintenance activities of the Department,
fallen trees and branches were removed usually after storms.  The
Department as well, removed trees which had been identified as
hazards either by the members of the public or Department personnel.
These were invariably obviously dead trees, with branches that could
fall on the highway.»
In 1983, in response to complaints from the public about dead trees
along the side of the roads, the engineer responsible for this roadway conducted
a study of the damaged trees in the area.  His intent was to quantify the problem
in order to secure sufficient budgetary funds to address the issue as he did not
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47. (1991), 101 N.S.R. (2d) 333, 275 A.P.R. 333, 6 C.C.L.T. (2d) 270.
48. (1992), 108 N.S.R. (2d) 254, 294 A.P.R. 254, 10 C.C.L.T. (2d) 207, 35 M.V.R. (2d) 191.
49. Ibid., at 265 (N.S.R.).
50. R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 371.
have the necessary funds to remove all of the trees at the time.
At trial, the Department was found liable, based on its negligence in
conducting the inspection of the trees47.  The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal48
reversed the lower court's decision and dismissed the claim for the following
reasons49 :
«(1) there is no statutory duty requiring the Minister to
maintain provincial highways;
(2) there is no liability imposed on an abutting owner for a
nuisance on an adjoining property;
(3) there is no statutory power to enter onto lands abutting the
highway to inspect or remove trees;
(4) any duty at common law to repair highways does not extend
to adjoining lands;
(5) even assuming a duty to remove dangerous trees from lands
abutting a highway, there was no evidence that the tree in
question constituted a danger prior to the accident;
(6) the finding by the trial judge that there was a policy to inspect
and remove diseased trees from adjoining lands which was
the key to his decision, was not supported by the evidence.»
The Supreme Court of Canada, in reviewing the legislation for an
exemption from liability, noted section 5 of the Public Highways Act50 :
«5.  The Minister may construct or maintain any highway, or may on
behalf of Her Majesty in right of the Province enter into contract or
agreements for such construction or maintenance, but nothing in this
Act compels or obliges the Minister to construct or maintain any
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52. J.G. FLEMING, The Law of Torts, 8th ed., Sydney, Law Book Co., 1992 at 155.
53. Supra, note 7, at 28.
54. Ibid.
highway or to expend money on any highway.» (emphasis added)
The court opined that the emphasized wording was not specific enough
to either provide immunity or preclude liability.  It turned to Anns for reference
to the significance of public duty once a statutory power had been exercised51.
«The author observes52...that prior to Anns ... , public authorities
"were excused because their statutory power did not create a legal
duty to come to the plaintiff's assistance".  This concept was
successfully challenged in Anns for although "the defendant was under
no public duty, ... the statutory power conferred on it for the health
and safety of the public engendered a private duty, once having
decided to exercise that power, to carry it out with due care."»
(original emphasis)
The court also dealt with issues raised by the respondent relating to the
differences between the Nova Scotia and British Columbia statutes, the latter
which the respondent asserted protected the Crown against liability.  He argued
that the Nova Scotia legislation «... provides that the province is only liable for
a tort committed by its officers or agents, if that tortious act of the servant or
agent would, in itself, have given rise to a cause of action»53.  The British
Columbia legislation, (the jurisdiction in which Just was decided), provides that
the Crown is liable to the same extent as a person of full age and capacity
without restriction or limitation to tort liability.  Cory J. dismissed this
argument54 :
«Obviously the Crown can only be liable as a result of the tortious
acts committed by its servants or agents since it can only act through
its servants or agents.  Let us assume, for the purposes of resolving
this issue, that the actions complained of by the appellant were indeed
negligent.  That is to say the failure of the Crown to rely on trained
personnel to inspect the trees and the failure of those persons or this
personnel to identify the tree in question as a hazard constituted
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55. Cory J. relied on section 4 of the Public Highways Act which states : 4. The Minister has the
supervision, management and control of the highways and of all matters relating thereto.
The judge said that this gave the Minister broad powers with respect to the highways and
went on to say, at 29 : It is rather bizarre to think that the Department of Transportation
could leave a very old, very large dead tree leaning precariously over the highway without
taking steps to remedy the situation, simply because it was located just outside the highway
right-of-way.
56. Ibid., at 30.
negligence.  Yet those very actions or failure to act were those of the
Crown's servants undertaken in the course of the performance of their
work.  If those were indeed acts of negligence then the Crown would
be liable.  The arguments of the Crown are regressive and to accept
them would severely restrict the ability of injured persons to claim
against the Crown.»
The court then turned its attention to the respondent's claim that the
Department of Transportation had no authority to enter the lands adjoining the
highway to remedy a dangerous situation.  This proposition was also rejected55.
Having examined the issue of the duty of care through the statutory
provisions, and dealt with the respondent's arguments, the court proceeded to the
crucial issue of the nature of the decision - policy versus operational.  In contrast
to the facts in Just where a policy existed to inspect the rock slopes for
potentially dangerous rocks, the matter before the Supreme Court within
Swinamer contained no such «policy» to inspect for dangerous trees.  A survey
had been undertaken to identify potentially dangerous trees in order that the
extent of the problem might be known and funds applied for to deal with the
issue, but this did not yet represent a policy.  Cory J. noted56 :
«The trial judge, in his reasons, reviewed the Department's decision
to conduct a survey with the object of ascertaining whether it
constituted a policy decision which would exempt the respondent from
the duty to remove the tree which caused the accident.  This is not the
correct approach.  The enquiry should not be aimed at determining
whether a policy decision has been made which specifically exempts
a governmental authority from tort liability.  Rather, it should be
directed at determining what decisions constituted policy and were
thus exempt from tort liability and what decisions or actions were
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58. Madame Justice McLachlin agreed with the conclusion of Cory J. but, like Sopinka J. in
Brown, found an alternative basis for her decision.  Having participated on the Court of
Appeal in Brown, she was not a part of the Supreme Court of Canada considering that case,
but one could divine her perspective.  She would have gone further in Swinamer.  From her
reading of Anns, McLachlin J. found that a policy decision to do something and then
exercised at the operational level in a negligent manner gives rise to a private law duty of
care.  In the case at hand, a policy decision to do something has not been made therefore
there is no corresponding duty.  Barratt is also authority for this approach.  In that case,
Martland J., at 585, was of the view : ... that the determination of the method by which the
Municipality decided to exercise its power to maintain the highway, including its inspection
system, was a matter of policy or planning, and that, absent negligence in the actual
operational performance of that plan, the appellant's claim fails.
operational and thus could, if negligent, attract liability.»
The court found that the survey represented a «preliminary step in the
policy making process».  Further evidence by the engineer as to the allocation
of funds to possibly deal with the matter reinforced the finding that this was a
policy matter and therefore outside the scope of review by the courts.
A final issue pertained to the question of negligence in the actions of the
Department insofar as the conduct of the survey.  On balance the court found no
negligence «demonstrated in the operational aspects of carrying out the policy
decision»57.
Cory J. stated, for the majority, that the court could not agree with the
first four conclusions of the Court of Appeal.  However, as in the Brown
decision, the Supreme Court dismissed the action on the basis of a finding of a
policy decision which the court held to be outside of its jurisdiction to review.
Also similar to the Brown case, the allegations of negligence (in the manner of
the survey of dead trees or trees that represented a hazard) were not supported
by the court's review of the facts.  Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed58.
VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
The early law on negligence liability of public authorities was set out in
East Suffolk, which was decided prior to the enactment of the Crown
Proceedings Act in the United Kingdom.  There it was held that public
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59. Supra, note 2 at 754 (A.C.), 501 (All E.R.).  du Parcq L.J.'s comments from  Kent v. East
Suffolk can be found in [1939] 4 All E.R. 174 at 184, [1940] 1 K.B. 319 at 338.
60. For a thorough discussion of the common law see : L.A. REYNOLDS and D. A. HICKS,
supra, note 8; M. Kevin WOODALL, «Private Law Liability of Public Authorities for
Negligent Inspection and Regulation», (1992) 37 McGill L.J. 83; Lewis N. KLAR, «The
Supreme Court of Canada :  Extending the Tort Liability of Public Authorities», (1990) 28
Alta L. Rev. 648.
61. Supra, note 5, at 1239.
authorities had absolute immunity from civil liability for discretionary decisions.
The Anns decision represented a radical departure from the notion that the
electorate carried the sole responsibility to judge the decisions and actions of
elected officials by use of their franchise, and instead tried to define a basis on
which public authorities would be liable.  As noted by Lord Wilberforce in his
examination of the statutory position of the council in Anns59 :
«It is no accident that the [Public Health Act] is drafted in terms of
functions and powers rather than in terms of positive duty.  As was
well said, public authorities have to strike a balance between the
claims of efficiency and thrift (du Parcq L.J. in East Suffolk) :
whether they get the balance right can only be decided through the
ballot box, not in the courts.»
The court's consideration of a method by which public authorities could
be judged led to the adoption of the conceptual distinction between «policy» and
«operational» decisions60.  Based on earlier decisions of other jurisdictions,
policy matters considered in a bona fide manner were held to provide no
exposure to civil liability.  Actions and decisions taken within the operational
sphere would be subject to the ordinary principles of negligence.
It had been suggested in Just61 that the expansion of the public sector
into almost all facets of daily life led to the need to examine the extent to which
principles of private law liability should realistically apply to public authorities.
Anns represents the foundation of the policy or operations diadic framework as
it is still applied in Canadian courts.  These two most recent cases from the
Supreme Court of Canada, Brown and Swinamer, add no new insights to the
policy versus operations distinction.  In fact they may be criticized for further
confusing and destabilizing it.
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62. See, eg., the House of Lords decision in Murphy v. Brentwood District Council [1991] 1
A.C. 398, [1990] 2 All E.R. 908.  It restricted the liability of the public authority to
situations of pure economic loss.
63. The leading case on governmental liability in tort in Australia is The Council of the Shire of
Sutherland v. Heyman, supra, note 28, found that policy versus operations is not a general
test for government liability in tort and is applicable only to situations where the public
authority made a decision not to act.  In New Zealand, the Privy Council found in Takaro
Properties v. Rowling [1987] 2 N.Z.L.R. 700 (P.C.) that the distinction «... does not provide
a touchstone of liability.»  Thus it would appear that while the Canadian courts are moving
in the direction of expanding the tort liability of the Crown through critical examination of
policy and operational matters of government, jurisdictions throughout the Commonwealth
are abandoning the distinction for other than the most specific of applications.
64. Supra, note 5, at 1245.
65. Supra, note 7, at 30.
What we do learn from Brown and Swinamer is the commitment of the
Supreme Court of Canada to stay the course with the principles and
indeterminate approach that were ushered in with Anns and which have been so
widely and consistently criticized.  This is so even in light of evidence that the
House of Lords62 and other Commonwealth jurisdictions63 are retreating from
Anns.  While it is unfortunate that they offer no assistance to more clearly
delineate or define those matters which fall within the policy sphere and those
which are plainly in the operations sphere, these decisions are nonetheless
significant in signalling the Supreme Court's adherence to the model, at least
until they can find or fashion something finer.
Consider an example of the uneven, if not capricious, application of the
principle.  Cory J. for the majority in Just held that «the manner and quality of
an inspection system is clearly part of the operational aspect of government
activity»64.  Matters of policy which are characterized by factors such as
budgetary considerations or personnel limitations were not sufficient in Just to
clothe the province with immunity as to its system of inspection of rocks along
highways.  Nevertheless, in Brown the court found that the summer schedule
was a policy decision.
In Swinamer, meanwhile, the Department of Transportation decision to
undertake a survey of dangerous trees was held to be «...a preliminary step in
what will become a policy decision involving the expenditure and allocation of
funds»65.  A survey considered to be preliminary to a policy decision had all the
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appearances of a system of inspection.  In what way is the survey of dead and
potentially dangerous trees different from the inspection of the rock work crew
whose job it was to identify loose or dangerous rocks?  In both circumstances
the workers failed to identify the source of the ultimate tragedy.  If a decision
which is «preliminary to a policy decision» provides immunity to the public
authority, at what point would a decision which is «pre-operational» cross over
from policy to operations?
The notion of budgetary constraint and political motive guiding the
determination is also circular.  Ultimately, every decision and action by
government is reducible to economic considerations.  Why would the law
consider that public authorities are immune to budgets and fiscal accountability
much in the same way as private organizations?  The same applies to political
motivation.  Every official action, inaction and utterance can be ultimately
attributed to political objective as it can be attributed to non-political purposes.
The court is not equipped to accurately surmise, if it can be done at all, and
balance the political content of the conduct of public authorities.
The effect of these seemingly irreconcilable judicial decisions is an
inexorable enlargement of the scope of civil liability.  This may be seen as
inescapable given the range of activities in which government is involved.  The
effect nevertheless has been to confer an abiding sense of chance in the
distinction between policy and operational matters.  
The frustrating lack of judicial unity continued with the Brown and
Swinamer decisions.  In Just, the three levels of court had six judges finding the
decision to be operational, while five judges found them to be grounded in
policy.  In Brown and Swinamer, divergent conclusions were not a major
problem at the Supreme Court of Canada but the court was split on both the use
of the policy versus operations approach, what it means and the manner in which
the determination is reached.  Yet it is this framework which structures the
application of duty of care which, in turn, ultimately leads to the conclusion
about liability.  Characterizing the «either/or» result along these lines, where
everything rests upon the all-or-nothing conclusion, is like pulling a rabbit out
of the hat.  Injured people can always be expected to look for compensation to
the deep pocket of government.  It is of course the taxpayers who will pay for
the negligence of Crown agents.  What is there, moreover, to prevent this
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66. See, eg., P. W. HOGG, Liability of the Crown, supra, note 19 at Preface, iv and 139-40.
As Director of the project of the Ontario Law Reform Commission on the Liability of the
Crown, Professor Hogg's opinion is also contained within the Report on The Liability of
the Crown, 1989, supra, note 13.
67. One is reminded of the words of Aristotle, from Nicomachean Ethics, circa 340 B.C. in this
context :
It makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded a bad man or a bad man defrauded
a good man, or whether a good or bad man has committed adultery : the law can look only
to the amount of damage done. (emphasis added).
68. Supra, note 4, at 673.
particular issue from being decided upon the judge's view of the degree of
compassionate grounds for recovery?
Some commentators have called for Crown liability to accord more
closely to the private law duty of care66. Any immunity is thought to promote
negligence, or at least countenance it, and reduce public accountability. These
proponents would likely be content with the trend to expand the scope of
liability.  After all, what difference should it make to a plaintiff if he or she was
injured from private or public neglect67.  The injury is equally grievous in both
cases.  On the other hand, the law must permit the Government to govern in the
public interest without concern for adverse consequences that might be visited
upon each particular individual.  To hold that its decisions of a policy nature
would be subject to review by the courts would pitch the entire system of
government and administration into a quagmire, likely to be bogged down by a
flood of claims given the enormous expanse of activities in which various levels
of government are involved each day.  This concern received attention by
Wilson J. in Kamloops from the perspective that any finding of a duty of care
comparable to that of the private individual carried with it the risk of opening
the «floodgates and creat(ing) an open season on municipalities»68.  Moreover,
the claims are likely to be greeted with woolly, but nevertheless demanding,
standards of public performance which would exceed the prescriptions of
conduct for private defendants. The public authority could always have done
more to avoid the accident.
It could be argued that every decision of a public authority could be
characterized as a policy decision while every action could be held to be
operational.  Or, that every activity of government contains within it policy as
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69. Cf. HOGG supra, note 19, at 139 :
To be sure, the planning-operational distinction is merely one of degree, and the existence
and definition of the common law duty of care remain imprecise.  But similar comments
could be made about the negligence doctrines that are applicable to private activity.
70. See, Report on The Liability of the Crown, Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1989,
supra, note 13, at 24.
well as operational elements which co-exist on a continuum.  While this may be
a satisfactory circumstance for some, it remains as ambiguous as the current
analysis69.
This approach has been defended as offering as much definition as can
be brought to the issues.  This is the view of the Ontario Law Reform
Commission70 :
«In our view, the common law of torts has been reasonably successful
in developing and adapting tort principles in ways that are
appropriate to public sector activity by the Crown.  For example, the
operational/planning distinction in torts accommodates, in what we
regard as a generally satisfactory manner, the essential policy-making
role of government, while imposing a reasonable duty of care on the
Crown and its servants in their day-to-day activities.»
The suggestion of numerous academic writers following the Just
decision that the scope for policy decisions would be severely restricted while
the operational sphere would be enhanced has not been borne out by these most
recent decisions.  Policy decisions continue to be characterized by an
expenditure of funds, budgetary constraints, personnel limitations - «decisions
involving social, political and economic factors.»  There was no distinction in
the Brown and Swinamer cases as to the level of the decision making which had
previously been raised as a determining factor in Just.
Given the decision of the Court not to seize the opportunity presented
by Brown and Swinamer to chart a new direction in the area of liability for
public authorities, the examination of alternatives and scholarly dissertations
might just as well be set aside for now.  The court could scarcely send a clearer
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recourse, on the grounds of scarce judicial resources and the need for a concrete factual
background, may explain its reluctance to enlarge the scope of public authority liability for
negligence.  See, eg. Canadian Council of Churches v. Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration) [1992] 1 S.C.R. 236, (1992), 88 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 132 N.R. 241 and Hy
and Zel's Inc. et al. v. Ontario (Attorney General) and Paul Magder Furs Ltd. et al. v.
Ontario (Attorney General), (1994) 107 D.L.R. (4th) 634 (S.C.C.).  But cf. Conseil du
Patronat v. Quebec (Attorney General) [1991] 3 S.C.R. 685, 87 D.L.R. (4th) 287.
72. «Taking the Government to Court :  Advanced Issues in Public Law»,  Continuing Legal
Education Seminar, the Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia.  Held in
Vancouver, British Columbia, February 16, 1990. at 4.1.02.
signal that its course is set on hold71.  One observes that the personal injury
suffered in most of the recent Canadian cases arose from motor vehicle
accidents on public roadways.  This often produces a seriously injured plaintiff,
whom compassion can favour heavily, in comparison to the inert and virtually
infinite juridical person of the Crown.  The law applying to public authorities
must be certain not to develop by proxy as the law of motor vehicle mishaps on
public property.
Efforts nevertheless should be directed toward refining and modelling
the delineations which are decisive to the analysis.  In this regard, Professor
Hogg's thoughts are apposite72 :
«The merit of the word "planning" is that it implies decision-making
of a generality and complexity that can plausibly be contrasted with
the "operational" level of decision-making.  Decision-making at the
planning level depends upon a range of policy considerations that a
court cannot be expected to evaluate, let alone replicate.  This is the
reason for immunity : the question whether a planning decision has
been made negligently is a question that is not suitable for judicial
resolution.»
In the meantime, legislative bodies which still find themselves
dissatisfied with the extent of civil liability flowing from the decisions of public
authorities continue to grip the ultimate lever of public policy : the power to
enact legislation itself.  They might consider enactment of protective exemptions
where public authorities are engaged, to foreclose the issue.  Keeping in mind
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Cory J.'s comments from Swinamer relative to the duties and the powers of the
Minister contained in the Public Highways Act, legislative drafters are cautioned
to capture a «clear statutory exemption».
